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LYDIA CAMACHO-ROMISHER*

The Regulatory Life Cycle and
Regulatory Concerns for the Utilities
of the Northern Mariana Islands
ABSTRACT
In its endeavor to exercise its newly recognizedright of local selfgovernance, the Commonwealth of the NorthernMarianaIslands,
consistingof government officials, business leaders, and members
of the general public, has been considering how to develop the
Commonwealth's infrastructureso that it can become more selfsufficient. The Commonwealth, untilrecently, wasgovernedby the
United States and now must implement its own methods of
regulationin order to sustain and develop its economy and protect
its citizens and its environment As part of its growth toward
economic and regulatoryself-sufficiency, the Commonwealth has,
beginning in 1986, focused on whether it should privatize its
government-owned utility structure. This article analyzes the
Commonwealth's steps towardprivatizationand concludes thatthe
government should continue to develop its regulatoryinfrastructure so that it can regulate the management and operationof each
utility in order to ensurefair, equitable, and cost-effective utility
servicesfor all residents.
INTRODUCTION
This article discusses the development on the part of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (the Commonwealth) of a
regulatory infrastructure in its endeavors to become economically and
politically self-sufficient. Attention is also given to the Commonwealth's
regulatory development by analyzing its deliberation over whether or not
it should privatize its government-owned and operated utility system. The
analysis and discussion provided in this article are useful not only to
achieve a better understanding of the Northern Mariana Islands, but also
to better understand how government regulation begins and why it is so
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crucial in enabling a newly independent government to protect its citizenry
and provide for economic growth and stability.
This article first provides the reader with a background of the
demographics, the political history and structure of the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the applicable statutory law governing public utilities in the
Northern Mariana Islands. Next, the article explains problems associated
with the current utility structure and discusses the impetus for privatizing
this structure. The potential benefits, drawbacks, and impediments to
privatization are then analyzed. This discussion includes interrelated topics
concerning government and regulatory principles, the operation and
maintenance of the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC), and
certain economic, political, and legal issues affecting the privatization of the
CUC and the Commonwealth's development of its newly formed
regulatory infrastructure. Finally, the article concludes with recommendations for how the Commonwealth Government should proceed in its steps
toward privatizing the CUC.
Demographics of the Northern Mariana Islands
The Northern Mariana Islands are situated in Micronesia, which is
a geographical region within Oceania.1 Oceania is a large area that is
comprised of approximately ten thousand islands spread throughout the
Pacific Ocean.2 Among the principal insular geographical divisions that
have emerged from Oceania are three cultural island areas that include
Micronesia, "small islands," Melanesia, "black islands," and Polynesia,
"many islands."' Polynesia includes the Hawaiian Islands, Western and
American Samoa, Tonga, Nuie, and French Polynesia (Tahiti).' Melanesia
is southwest of Polynesia, and is north of Australia and New Zealand.5 It
includes such islands as Papua New Guinea, the Solomons, Vanuatu, Fiji,
and New Caledonia.' Micronesia is right above Melanesia and includes
such islands as the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the Federated States
of Micronesia, Belau, the Carolina Islands, and the Marshall Islands.7 The
residents of these islands are culturally diverse, with differences in

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

See DOUGLAS L. OLIVER, THE PACIFIC ISLANDS 3,76 (2d ed. 1961).
Seeid. at3.
See id. at 23, 64, 76.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 37.
See id.
See id. at 76-77.
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language, religious beliefs, social organization, and technological development.8
Micronesia comprises the northern-most duster of islands in
Oceania and consists of approximately 2,100 islands." The Mariana Islands
consist of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands,"0 which are separated
into two distinct political entities, both of which are in political union with
the United States." The Northern Mariana Islands are comprised of
fourteen islands located above Guam. 2 The Northern Mariana Islands
include Rota, Aguijuan, Tinian, Saipan, Farallon de MedinUlla, Anatahan,
Sariguan, Guguan, Alamagan, Pagan, Agrigan/Agrihan, Asuncion, Maug,
and Farallon de Pajaros (Uracas). 3 These islands have one of the most
equitable climates in the world.1'
The total land area of the Northern Mariana Islands is 176.5 square
miles" and, as of 1997, is home to approximately 62,300 people.1 ' The three
largest and most populated islands are Saipan, Tinian, and Rota. 7 Saipan
is the largest island, with a land area of 47.5 square miles,'g and is home to
approximately ninety percent of the Commonwealth's population,
approximately one-third of which are indigenous to the Mariana Islands.1
Saipan lies about 3,200 miles west of Honolulu, about 5,800 miles southwest of San Francisco, about 1,200 miles south of Tokyo, and about 2,000
miles from Seoul.2' Tinian is the second largest island, with a land area of

8. See id. at 16-25,77; John M. Romisher, A Study about Community Education in the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 8 (1974) (unpublished PID. dissertation, University
of Nebraska (Lincoln)) (on file with University of Nebraska Library).
9. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 76.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 400-03, 420-22; Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
Government, History and Politics (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.mariana-

islands.gov.mp/history.htm> [hereinafter CNMI History & Politics].
12. See OLIVER, supra note 1, at 76; Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
Government, Geography (visited Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.marianaislands.gov.mp/geog.htm> [hereinafter CNMI Geography].
13. See CNMI Geography, supra note 12.
14.
15.
16.

See id.
See id.
See Bank of Hawaii, CNMI Economic Report, Commonwealth ofthe Northern Mariana

Islands Economic Report: CNMI Summary & Map (1997) <http//www.boh.com/econ/
pacific/cnmi/02.asp> [hereinafter CNMI Summary & MAp].
17.

See CNMI Geography,supra note 12.

18. See id.
19. See Bank of Hawaii, CNMI Economic Report, Commonwealth ofthe Northern Mariana
Islands Economic Report: Economic Indicators (1997) <http//www.boh.com/econ/

pacific/cnmi/06.asp> [hereinafter CNMI Economic Indicators].
20.

See CNMI Geography,supra note 12; CNMI Summary & Map, supra note 16.
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39.3 square miles, 1 and is home to approximately 2,600 people, about half
of which are indigenous to the Mariana Islands.' The third largest is Rota
Island, which measures 32.9 square miles' and is home to approximately4
3,500 people, about half of which are indigenous to the Mariana Islands.
The remaining eleven islands are much smaller and are significantly less
populated, if populated at all. For example, Farallon De Pajaros (0.8 square
miles), Maug (0.8 square miles), Asunsion(2.8 square miles), Sagriguan (1.9
square miles) and Aguijuan (2.8 square miles) are all uninhabited.' In
addition, Pagan (18.7 square miles) is uninhabited due to volcanic activity,
Guguan (1.6 square miles) is uninhabited and serves as a wildlife sanctuary, and Farallon De Medinilla (0.4 square miles) is uninhabited and is
used by the United States for military exercises.' The remaining islands are
sparsely populated. For example, Agrigan/Agrihan (18.3 square miles)
houses approximately 20 people, Alamagan (4.4 square miles) houses
approximately 70 people, and Anatahan (12.5 square miles) houses
approximately 65 people.'
The population of the Commonwealth continues to grow. The
CNMI (Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands) Population Report
showed that in 1973 the total population was 14,495; in 1980 it reported a
population of 16,780; and by 1990 and 1995, it reported that the figure had
grown significantly to a population of 43,345 and 58,846 respectively.' In
1997 the population increased to approximately 62,300 people.' About onethird of the population is comprised of citizens of the United States that are
not citizens of the Commonwealth." Interestingly, the comparison of the
population to the total number of visitors per year to the Commonwealth
is staggering. For example, the Governor's Office reported that 596,033
persons visited the islands in 1994; 676,161 in 1995; 737,117 in 1996; 694,797
in 1997; 490,165 in 1998; and 501,788 in 1999.3'

21. See CNMI Geography, supra note 12.
22. See Letter from Frank S. Rosario, Press Secretary, Public Information & Protocol
Office, Office of the Governor, to Lydia C. Romisher, author 4 (Mar. 16,2000) (on file with
author) (citing 1995 CNMI Mid-Decade Census Report tbl.1.12: Birthplace by Island 1995).
23. See CNMI Geography, supra note 12.
24. See Letter from Frank S. Rosario to Lydia C. Romisher, supra note 22, at 4.
25. See CNMI Geography,supra note 12.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Letter from Frank S. Rosario to Lydia C. Romisher, supranote 22, at 8 (tbl.A.2.0:
CNMI Population by Citizenship and Sex, 1973 to 1995).
29. See CNMI Summary & Map, supra note 16.
30. See id.; CNMI Economic Indicators,supra note 19.
31. See Letter from Frank S. Rosario to Lydia C. Romisher, supranote 22, at 2 (citing the
Mariana Visitor Center, tbl.8.1: CNMI Visitors Arrival by Month: Calendar Years 19941999); Bank of Hawaii, CNMI Economic Report, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
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The Commonwealth's economy is primarily supported by taxes
generated by tourism, garment manufacturing, service companies, and
retail stores.' Even though the Commonwealth has recently experienced
considerable economic growth, the economy is very fragile and is primarily
controlled by outside markets and certain federal laws of the United States,
like those pertaining to textile industries. At the present time, the Commonwealth's economy is experiencing numerous challenges, namely from
substantial fiscal reductionbased on reduced tourism and the United States
Government's present interference with the Commonwealth's textile
industry and immigration and labor laws." On a positive note, however,
the garment or textile industry has shown a 37 percent increase in
revenue.' Such increases mitigate some revenue loss from the downturn
in tourism and other non-apparel industries. 3
POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS
Historical Background
Over the years, the indigenous inhabitants of the Northern
Mariana Islands have been governed by administrations from several
different nations. 6 From 1521 to 1899, Spain governed the islands.' In 1899,
Germany paid Spain $4.5 million for the acquisition of the Mariana Islands
(excluding Guam since it was already a U.S. Territory) and the Carolina
Islands.' Germany governed the islands until 1914, when Japan declared

Islands Economic Report: Economy by Sector (1997) <http//www.boh.com/econ/pacific/
cnmi/07.asp> [hereinafter CNMI Economy by Sector].
32. See CNMI Economy by Sector, supra note 31; CNMI Summary & Map, supra note 16.
33. SeeU.S.GENERALAccoUNTNGOFFICE,NAT'LSEC. &INT'LAFFAIRSDIV.REPORTNO.
B-255486,U.S. INSULARAREAS-DEVELOPMENTSTRATEGY AND BETTERCOORDINATION AMONG

U. S. AGENCIESARENEEDEDapp.I (GAO/NSIAD 94-62,1994) (availableat1994 WL 809975);
Bank of Hawaii, CNMI Economic Report, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
Economic Report: Introduction (1997) <http//www.boh.com/econ/pacific/cnmi/04.asp>;
Governor Pedro P. Tenorio, CNMI Testimony at U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and

Natural Resources Hearing 1 (Sept. 14, 1999) (available at Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Government, Speeches and Press Releases (Sept. 14, 1999)
[hereinafter Tenorio Senate
<http://net.saipan.com/cftemplates/exec/senate.htm>
Testimonyl.
34. See Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § IIIC (Economic Outlook).
35. See Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at §§ 1II.B (Strategic Economic
Planning), III.C (Economic Outlook).
36.

See HAROLDF. NUFER, MICRONESIA UNDERAMERICANRULE: ANEVALUATIONOF THE

STRATEGIC TRUSTEESHIP (1947-77) 3-10, 26-30 (1978).
37. See id. at 4.
38. See id. at 6.
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war on Germany and the Japanese navy seized the islands. 9 Japan retained
control of the islands until 1945. 40 During Japan's administration, the
League of Nations formulated the objectives for the Japanese administration of the Islands." Then, in 1945 the United States Navy took control of
the islands fromJapan. 2 In 1947, the United Nations designated Micronesia
as a Strategic Trust Territory and placed the Northern Mariana Islands
under the administration of the United States."
Beginning in 1951, the United States began governing the Mariana
Islands through the Department of Interior." The Department of Interior
restricted entry to the Northern Mariana Islands and used the islands for
various military activities. 5 Under the Trusteeship Agreement the United
States pledged to "[piromote the economic advancement and selfsufficiency of the inhabitants.. .by encouraging the development of
fisheries, agriculture and industries."' Economic development, however,
did not really begin for approximately thirty years, until the Trusteeship
Agreement was replaced with the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth
of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States
(the Covenant)."
The trustee relationship between the United States and the
Northern Mariana Islands ended on November 3,1986, when the Covenant
became effective.' Discussion of the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement began in 1970. 9 In 1975, the people of the Northern Mariana
Islands held a plebiscite in which 78 percent of the eligible voters voted to
negotiate a covenant with the United States.' The goal in negotiating the
Covenant was to establish a commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands in political union with the United States so that the people of the
Northern Mariana Islands could become more politically and economically

39. See id. at 10.
40. See id. at 26.
41. See Romisher, supra note 8, at 16.
42. See NuFER, supra note 36, at 36.
43. See id. at 43, 45.

44. See id. at49.
45. See id.; CNMI History& Politics,supra note 11.
46. Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § III.A (Economic History). See also
NUFER, supra note 36, at 29.
47. See Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § II.A (Economic History).
48. See Proclamation No. 5564 § 1, 51 Fed. Reg. 40,399; 40,399 (1986) reprinted in 48
U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Proclamations).
49. See CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
50. See CNMI History & Politics, supra note 11; Proclamation No. 4534,42 Fed. Reg.
56,593; 56,593 (1977) reprintedin 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Proclamations).
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self-sufficient.51 The Covenant between the Northern Mariana Islands and
the United States became effective in 1976 after it was approved by a
majority of indigenous voters in the Northern Mariana Islands, adopted by
the Mariana Island's District Legislature, adopted by the Congress of the
United States, and signed by the President of the United States.-2
As a result of its commonwealth status, the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands is now a self-governing political entity that will
be in permanent political union with the United States. The relationship
embodied in the Covenant is patterned after the relationship between the
United States and Puerto Rico as well as the relationship between the
United States and Guam.' The Covenant of the Northern Mariana Islands
does, however, contain unique provisions that are not present in either the
agreement between the United States and Puerto Rico or the agreement
between the United States and Guam. '
The provisions of the Covenant establish the political relationship
between the United States and the people of the Northern Mariana Islands
and provide guidelines to assist the Commonwealth in becoming selfgoverning.'5 Toward this end, the Covenant provides for the formulation
and amendment of a constitution of, for, and by the people of the Northern
Mariana Islands; guidelines concerning citizenship and nationality;judicial,
legislative, and executive authority; and the creation, implementation, and
enforcement of the Commonwealth's own revenue and taxation mechanism.' The Covenant also specifies which United States constitutional and
statutory provisions apply to the Commonwealth, provides for representation of the Commonwealth by its own officials in Congress, and outlines
the availability of financial assistance from the United States. s' Most
importantly, the Covenant reiterates the commitment of the United States
to assist the government of the Northern Mariana Islands in its efforts to
achieve a progressively higher standard of living for its people and to
develop the economic resources needed to meet the financial

51. See Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of
Covenant) [hereinafter The Covenant]; Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § ILA
(Economic History); CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
52. See Proclamation No. 4534,42 Fed. Reg. 56,593; 56,593 (1977) reprintedin 48 U.S.C.
§ 1801 note (1994) (Proclamations).
53. See MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM'N, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE
COVENANTTO ESTABLISH ACOMMONWEALTHOFTHENORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 2 (1975).

54. See id.
55. See id. at 2-5.
56.

See generallyThe Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant). See also
supra note 53.
See generallyThe Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant). See also

MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM'N,

57.

MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM'N, supra note 53.
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responsibilities of local self-government.' Along these lines, the provisions
of the Covenant include economic development tools that (1) grant the
Commonwealth control over immigration into the Commonwealth, (2)
exempt the Commonwealth from the minimum wage provisions of federal
law, (3) exclude the Northern Mariana Islands from the customs territory
of the United States, and (4) permit goods from the Commonwealth to
enter the United States in the same manner as do goods from Guam."
The political structure of the Commonwealth government is
fashioned after the political structure of the United States so that the
powers of the various branches of government are balanced and the
citizens of the Islands have equal representation.' Similar to the political
structure of the United States, the Islands now have a central government
that consists of an elected governor, an executive administration appointed
by the Governor, a bicameral legislature, and a judicial system comprised
of a superior court and a supreme court.61 Appeals from the Commonwealth's Supreme Court are directed to the United States Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals and then to the United States Supreme Court.' There is
also a United States District Court on Saipan and a United States Attorney
General's Office for the Commonwealth.' Additionally, the Commonwealth has a resident representative to the United States who is a nonvoting delegate in Washington, D.C."
The executive branch of the Commonwealth government is headed
by a Governor and a Lieutenant Governor that are elected on the same
platform for a term of four years.' The legislature is a bicameral body and
currently includes a nine-member Senate and an eighteen-member House
of Representatives." The Senate is made up of nine elected members, three
from each of the following: from Rota, from Saipan and the islands north
of it, and from Tinian and Aguijuan combined.' The House of Representatives, which is apportioned according to population, has 16 representatives
from Saipan, one from Rota, and one from Tinian and Aguijuan
combined.' The seat of the Commonwealth Government is situated in

58. See The Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant), at art. VII.
59. See Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § II1.A (Economic History); The
Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant), at §§ 503,603.
60. See The Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant), at art. II, § 203.
61. See generally N. MAR. I.CONST.; CNMI History & Politics, supra note 11.

62. See CNMI History &Politics,supra note 11.
63. See id.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.; N. MAR. I. CONST. art. V.
See N. MAR. I. CONST. art. III; CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
See N. MAR. I. CONST. art II; CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
See N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 2; CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
See N. MAR. I. CONST. art. II, § 3; CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
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Saipan.6' The legislative branch of the Commonwealth Government has the
power to enact legislation for the public good as long as such legislation is
not inconsistent with treaties or international agreements of the United
States, the Covenant, and laws of the United States that are applicable to
the Northern Mariana Islands as part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands or applicable separately to the Northern Mariana Islands."
Local island governments are headed by elected mayors. For
example, currently there is a mayor for the island of Rota, a mayor for the
Island of Tinian, a mayor for the Island of Saipan, and a mayor for the
remaining Northern Islands combined.' Additionally, the islands of Rota,
Tinian, and Saipan have their own elected city councils that have the power
to legislate their own local laws.'
One of the changes created by the Constitution through the
Covenant was that the Commonwealth Government received greater
responsibility for administering governmental services and implementing
laws for the benefit of its peoples' health, safety, and general welfare, such
as public utilities. 3 Public utilities were managed by the United States
Navy during the early 1940s and later by the United States Department of
Interior through the Trust Territory's Public Works Department! 4 The
Commonwealth is currently in charge of providing road maintenance,
electricity, water, and sewer services. The Commonwealth's governmental
infrastructure, as inherited from the Trust Territory era, however, was
"weak, incomplete and needed significant improvements." 76 However,
with the help of Capital Development funding from the United States and
funds generated by the Commonwealth's textile industry, the Commonwealth is working to build its regulatory infrastructure so it can better
serve and protect its constituents."

69. See CNMI History & Politics,supra note 11.
70. See Dep't of the Interior, Secretarial Order No. 2989 pt. III § 6,41 Fed. Reg. 15,892;
15,894(1976).
71. See N. MAR. I. CoNST. art. VI.
72. See id. at art. VI, § 6(a).
73. See id. at art 1II,§ 17.
74. See NUFER, supra note 36, at 43,45,49; Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at
§ III.A (Economic History).
75. See CH2MHILL, FINAL REPORT, FEASIBILITY STUDY: PRIVATIZATION OF VARIOUS
UTILITIES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 1-1 (1997).

76. Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at § III.A (Economic History).
77. See Governor Pedro P. Tenorio, CNMI Testimony at U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Resources § II (Sept. 16,1999) (availableat Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands, Government, Speeches and Press Releases (Sept. 16, 1999) <http://net.
saipan.com/cftemptates/exec/house.htm> [hereinafter Tenorio House of Representatives
Testimony].
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Federal Jurisdiction in the Commonwealth
Not all federal laws are applicable in the Commonwealth. Article
V, Section 502 of the Covenant provides that some laws of the United States
in existence at the time the Covenant was adopted and laws of the United
States that apply to Guam as a territory of the United States are also
applicable to the Commonwealth.5 In addition, Article V, Section 503 of the
Covenant provides that laws of the United States not explicitly applicable
to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands or the Commonwealth do not
apply to the Commonwealth.? Thus, federal utility laws generally do not
apply to the Commonwealth.
The Federal Government, through the Department of Interior's
Office of Insular Affairs, does, however, exercise close oversight of the
development and operations of the Commonwealth's utility structure.o
The Department of Interior exercises oversight by imposing conditions on
certain activities of the Commonwealth's utility structure, the Commonwealth Development Authority (CDA), and the Commonwealth Government.!' These conditions are mainly designed to improve utility services
provided to consumers of the Commonwealth and are imposed because the
Commonwealth has entered into a series of funding grants and loan
agreements with the United States.P Some of these conditions fall within
the areas of supervising fiscal management accountability, conducting
management assessments of utility operations, and enacting legislation to
create a utility regulatory commission.s'
Status of the Commonwealth's Regulatory Infrastructure
Prior to 1985, public utilities such as power, water, and sewer
systems were managed as a division of the Commonwealth Public Works
Department and called the Commonwealth Utility Rate Commission." On
October 1,1985, the Commonwealth Legislature enacted Public Law 4-47,

78. The Covenant, 48 U.S.C. § 1801 note (1994) (Text of Covenant), at art. V, § 502.
79. Id. at art. V, § 503.
80. See DELOITE & TOUCHE, COMMONWEALTH UTILITIES CORPORATION: INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS' REPORTSONCOMPLIANCE wrrH LAWSAND REGULATIONS, YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER

30,1995 14,16 (1996); METZLER & ASSOC., MANAGEMENT AUDIT OF THE COMMONWEALTH

UTILrIES CORPORATION 8-9 (1994).
81. See DELOITTE &TOUCHE, supra note 80, at 14; METZLER &ASSOC., supranote 80, at
8-9.
82. See DELOITTE &TOUCHE, supra note 80, at 14.

83. See id.
84. SeeCommonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I.CODE § 8121(b) (Supp. 1994);
METZLER &ASSOC., supranote 80, at 6.
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which changed the previous public utility regulatory structure by creating
the Commonwealth Utilities Corporation (CUC).5 The Commonwealth
legislature first attempted to enact utility regulation through Public Law 447 and Public Law 3-11, Sections 603 and 604, by imposing price controls
on electric and water charges."M The purpose of Public Law 4-47, as
amended by Public Law 6-30, was to create a public utility that would
provide utility services, including the delivery of electric, water, sewer,
cable television and telephone services, to the inhabitants of the Commonwealth.87
The CUC is a semi-autonomous public corporation that consists of
a nine-member Board of Directors appointed by the Commonwealth
Governor for a term consisting of four years.'M The Board has a legal and
fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the CUC for the betterment of the
Commonwealth." In addition, the Board is responsible for the operation
and maintenance of public utilities in the Commonwealth.' This responsibility includes the following duties:
1. Supervising the construction, maintenance operations, and
regulation of all utility services, including power, sewage,
refuse collection, road maintenance, telephone, cable television,
and water. 1 For example, Section 8122(b) and 8123(k) of P.L. 447 as amended by P.L. 6-30, sections 16,17, and 18; and P.L. 823, section 18, gives the CUC the power to "regulate cable,
telephone and other utility services to the extent permitted by
applicable federal law and the contractual obligations of the
Commonwealth [G]overnment."n
2. Establishing rates for utility services, conducting metering and
billing for services used, and collecting fees in a fair and
rational manner from all customers of utility services." Section
(m) also provides CUC with the power and authority to set
rates "[tjo the extent the Corporation deems lawful and
necessary, to review and establish utility rates and other fees
for water, sewer, telephone, cable television, and electrical

85.

SeeCommonwealthUtilitiesCorporation,4 N.MAR.I.CODE§ 8121(a) (Supp. 1994).

86. See User Fees, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE §§ 1603, 1604 (Supp. 1990); Commonwealth
Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 8143 (Supp. 1990).
87. See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 8121 (Supp. 1994).

88.
89.

See id. at § 8131; METZLER & ASSOc., supra note 80, at 7.
See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 8131 (Supp. 1994);

METZLER & ASSOC., supra note 80, at 7.

90. See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 8134 (Supp. 1992).
91. See id. at § 8122(a).
92.

Act of Oct. 1,1985, Pub. L. No. 4-47

§

1, amended by Pub. L. No. 6-30 § 16.

93. See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation,4 N. MAR. 1.CODE§ 8122(b) (Supp. 1994).
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power; except that no fee for water, sewer and electrical power
shall be charged which is higher than the actual cost to the
"
Corporation to connect customers to Corporation facilities. 94
3. Exercising entry and exit controls of utility services. 95
4. Providing life-line utility services at lower rates for the benefit
of low-income consumers."8
5. Administering CUC's assets, liabilities, operations, and
unexpended capital such that the CUC can work toward
becoming financially independent of appropriations by the
Commonwealth Legislature.' In fact, in July 1985, in a Special
Representative Agreement negotiated between the Commonwealth Government and the United States Government, the
Commonwealth Government agreed that the utility system
would be placed on a full cost recovery basis within three years
after passage of the enabling statute." Unfortunately, full cost
recovery has not yet been achieved by the CUC."
The Corporation shall, within 90 days of confirmation of all
Board members, implement a plan by which it or its designee
will establish rates, meter, bill and collect fees in a fair and
rational manner from all consumers of utility services it has
not privatized so that the Corporation will be financially
independent of all appropriations by the Commonwealth
Legislature by the end of three complete fiscal years from
October 1, 1985."
Public Law 4-47 also gives the CUC the option to either operate
and maintain public utilities on its own, or to contract these functions out
through privatization agreements with privately owned utilities. 1 Public
Law 4-47, as amended by Public Law 6-30, section 15, also gives the CUC
the ability to regulate private entities that provide utility services.1" The
statute specifies that "if a service has been turned over to the private
sector.., the Compliance Division shall monitor the performance, rates, and

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at § 8123(m).
See id. at § 8122(b).
See id.
at § 8141(d).
See id. at§ 8122(b); DELOITE&TOUCHE, COMMONWEALTH UTILMITES CORPORATION:

REPORT ON THE AUDITOF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH OMB CIRCULAR A128, YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,1995 7 (1996); METZLER & ASSOC., supra note 80, at 6-7.
98. See METZLER & ASSOC., supra note 80, at 6.

99. See id.
100. Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE § 8122(b) (Supp. 1994).
101. See id, at §§ 8123(h), (i).
102. See id. at § 8123(k).
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contractual compliance of the private sector enterprise." 3 The Act further
states that "whenever feasible the Corporation shall contract for private
business to assume its duties with respect to one or more of its
divisions."" ' Furthermore, the Act gives the Board the authority to
promulgate standards and rules to regulate its utilities."5
The Act thus provides the CUC with the appropriate mechanism
to carry out its duties and responsibilities, with or without privatization,
through contractual arrangements for services and indicates that the CUC
has the authority to adjust to economic developments in the Northern
Mariana Islands.
REGULATORY PRINCIPLES AND THE REGULATORY LIFE CYCLE
Goals and Purposes of Regulating Utilities
Regulating utilities is an important government role that involves
social, economic, environmental, and political considerations in delivering
crucial services to people. The aim of governmental regulation of utility
services is to ensure that people receive safe, affordable, and dependable
utility services.' ° Because the social, economic, environmental, and political
factors involved in providing safe, affordable, and reliable utility services
changes over time, it is crucial that governmental regulation be able to
respond to these changes. 0" The response of a regulatory agency to
changes in such factors has been described as a "regulatory life cycle." 1"
In the regulatory life cycle described by Shapiro and Tomain there
are six stages.109 The first stage is marked by little or no regulation. 1 In this
stage, goods and services are provided by the free market.' The second
stage begins when the free market fails."' This occurs when services are not
adequate, or become too expensive, or the market does not protect the
environment or other socially recognized goods."3 In response, the
government enters stage three with regulatory solutions for the problems

103. Id. at § 8121(d).
104. Id. at § 8122(a).
105. See id. at § 8123(o).
106.

See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND POLICY 38-39

(1993).

107. See id. at 56-57.
108. See id. fig.2-1.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 57.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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created by the market failures. 14 Stage four occurs when the regulatory
solutions implemented by the government begin to fail." 5 This happens
because circumstances surrounding and impacting the industry being
regulated change or regulatory enforcement or implementation of the
regulatory solutions are inadequate to fix the problems. 1 ' In stage five, the
government attempts to fix the regulatory failures through regulatory
reform."" Often regulatory reform is successful and the regulatory cycle
oscillates between stage four, regulatory failure, and stage 5, regulatory
reform.1 In rare circumstances, the government may decide to enter into
stage six of the regulatory life cycle and deregulate the subject industry.119
If this path
is chosen, the cycle begins anew with stage one, the free
12
market. 0
Evaluation of the Commonwealth's Regulatory Life Cycle
In the beginning of the Commonwealth's newly found selfgovernance it experienced a vacuum of government regulation. This
created certain problems. Some examples of problems in the Commonwealth caused by insufficient regulations pertain to the use of private water
wells, private power generators, and private septic tanks. First, private
water wells are drilled on private property in the Commonwealth by the
occupant. The water in the drilled well comes from a government-owned
water lens that separates fresh water from seawater. The danger of
breaking the water lens is a valid concern that has already been realized.
As a result, fresh water is hard to obtain and most people have to buy
bottled drinking water. Another example is the use of a power generator
purchased by an individual to provide electricity. This generator is
installed on private property. It produces sound and air pollution that
amounts to a public nuisance. In addition, private persons dig their own
sewage tanks on their private property. A small contractor builds it on a
part-time basis. There is no interest in having it inspected for safety and
quality by the government. A serious danger exists. The effluent is not
properly controlled and seeps into the water lens causing contamination.
Furthermore, concern exists in the Commonwealth about the amount of
pollution coming from the exhaust of power generators. There is additional
concern about ground pollution resulting from empty diesel fuel containers

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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left unattended beside the power plant. These problems are the result of a
lack of governmental regulation.
In response to these problems the Commonwealth moved away
from the free market and implemented regulations that require that citizens
obtain permits to drill water wells and build septic tanks.12 In addition, the
Commonwealth has been analyzing how to strengthen its regulatory
infrastructure so that it can provide safe, economical, and reliable utility
services to its constituents.' Toward this end, the Commonwealth enacted
Public Law 4-47 in response to the failure of private markets to function
adequately and the government's interest in regulating the conduct of
persons and firms in order to provide affordable, safe, and reliable utility
services.lu
The next problem, however, is that the CUC is not yet economically
self-sufficient. Financially, the CUC is insolvent." The cash flow of the
CUC "has been near zero or negative in nearly every year since 1989.""2
For example, total current assets for the CUC reported in 1995 amount to
$19,942,321.2 The total current liabilities of the CUC, however, amount to
$116,140,786.1 v Recently, the Saipan Tribune reported that equity conversion remains an option for CUC's $100 million liability (debt).'
In 1994 the CUC was unable to meet the need for increased
generation to satisfy economic development demands for power generation, power distribution, and water.' Peak demand for electricity grew
during 1988-1993 from 32 MW to over 50 MW for an average increase of
approximately eight percent per year.' At the same time, a number of new
hotels and developments provided their own power using self-generating
units and water desalinization units.1 31 The CUC needs to develop an
adequate reserve margin because the Commonwealth is located in an
island environment where neighboring utilities are not available from

121. See Regulations Governing the Use of CUC Water System, Authority and Purpose
§ 2 (1988); Regulations Governing the Use of Public Sewers, Authority and Purpose § 2
(1988).
122. See Tenorio House of Representatives Testimony, supra note 77, at § II (Covenant
Section 702 Grants are Expended on Vital Projects).
123. See SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 106, at 41.
124. See METZLER & ASSOc., supra note 80, at 1.
125. Id.
126.
127.
128.

See DELOITTE & TOUCHE, supra note 97, at 3.
See id. at 4.
See Aldwin R. Fajardo, Equity Conversion Remains an Option for CUC's $100-M

Liability, SAIPAN TRIB., Mar. 24, 2000, at *1, *1 (Online Edition) (available at
<http://www.tribune.co.mp>).
129.

See METZLER & Assoc., supra note 80, at 4-5.

130. See id. at 4.
131.

See id.
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which to buy power, and where frequent typhoons can disrupt power
generation and distribution capability."Z Otherwise, major businesses have
to become self-sufficient to hedge against inadequate utility services."'
Additional reasons for businesses being self-sufficient are that (1) major
developments are required by the Coastal Resources Management Office
to document that they are building a facility that is self sufficient in power
and water in order to receive their permit to begin construction, and (2) the
power service usually provided by the CUC is inefficient and is often more
expensive to use by a developer."l
Services provided by the CUC, and its capability to collect revenue
from these services, are considered pivotal economic activities.1" The
Commonwealth Government is losing revenue by allowing other
companies to operate their own power generators instead of tapping into
the CUC system."3'
In order to accomplish regulatory reform, the CUC is working on
amending its existing regulations and is discussing the possibility of
privatizing its utility structure. Toward this end, the Commonwealth
Government, upon inception of its Commonwealth Status, embarked upon
creating its own economic development roadmap as evidenced by the 1986
Economic Development Priorities: A Blue Print for Good Growth.' This
report, as discussed infra, takes the position that privatizing the Commonwealth's utilities will help reduce governmental expenditures and improve
the reliability, efficiency, and affordability of utility services to residents
and businesses."
The Commonwealth Government's regulatory role, regardless of
whether it engages in the privatization of its remaining public utilities, is
to amend its laws to provide the CUC with sufficient authority to regulate
private enterprises that provide utility services. Such changes should
mirror the regulatory authority that is normally afforded to public utility
commissions in the United States. In any event, even if the government
decides to continue to operate its utilities itself, the CUC should be given
expanded power to regulate businesses that impact the Commonwealth's
ability to provide utility services.

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 21-24.
See CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at S-7.
See METZLER & ASSOC., supra note 80, at 4.
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EVALUATION OF PRIVATIZATION AS A SOLUTION
General Principles
There are numerous reasons why any government, either in the
United States or internationally, chooses to privatize their utilities.'" For
example, governments may choose to privatize their utilities due to the
capital-intensive nature of providing utility services and the fact that the
cost of operating its utilities on its own drains limited government
resources."*° Other reasons to privatize are to improve the efficiency and
reliability of the utility, to lower utility rates, and to facilitate economic
growth. 4 In addition, governments often desire to privatize their utilities
in an effort to downsize government spending and involvement in
operating their public utilities.' 2 This desire is often motivated by the
philosophical belief that businesses are run more economically and
efficiently by private industry."t
Contracting-out and franchising are the most common methods of
privatizing utility services. Contracting-out, also known as "outsourcing,"
is by far the most common means of privatization in the United States.1"
There are many different approaches the CUC could take to privatize
utility services. For example, assets could be leased to private operators
who would then provide utility services to the public subject to regulation
by the CUC.1 " Franchise arrangements could be made under which the
CUC would grant the right to one or more firms to provide specified
services subject to conditions such as the obligation of the franchisee to pay
the CUC either a percentage or a flat fee of the revenues received from

consumers." Joint ventures could be arranged between the CUC and

private entities. 4 7 CUC assets could be transferred to consumer cooperatives that would then provide utility services.'" A joint venture between
CUC employees and the Commonwealth Government could be
arranged.14 The CUC could divest its power distribution business and sell

139. See CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at 1-5.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1-1 to 1-4.
145. See id. at 1-1.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Laurence S. Belinsky, Municipal Power Systems Should ConsiderPrivatization,
ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER, Sept. 1, 1997, at 11, 11 (availableat 1997 WL 9399100).
149. See id.
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its assets outright, offering their poles and wires to the private sector in
exchange for a healthy deposit to the Commonwealth treasury, or the
Commonwealth Government may choose to privatize gradually,
outsourcing functions such as billing and collections to an outside firm.' °
Should the government disengage from the retail side of their
utility business in this way, it provides power retailers with a unique
opportunity to get ahead of their competitors, assuming that there are
competitors interested in operating a Commonwealth utility.' This option
is not very feasible, however, because it is unlikely that the small population of the Commonwealth could support competition among utilities.
In 1986, the Saipan Chamber of Commerce introduced the first
economic development plan to address the need for future expansion of
public utilities in order to help foster continued economic development of
the Islands.k2 "The Economic Development Plan, the Blueprint for Good
Growth," addressed the issue of public power as a "[njeed for [a] reliable
power generation and distribution system where outages are infrequent
and power supply is of consistent and correct voltage."" The Blueprint for
Good Growth also recognized the importance of planning for adequate
infrastructure for utilities by stating that the Commonwealth needs "[a]
well planned, reliable generation and distribution system which takes into
consideration renovation and expansion to correct current problems and
meet increasing economic growth."'
The Blueprint for Good Growth further proposed that the
Commonwealth Government consider removing government subsidies for
power over time by adjusting rates and turning the power generation and
distribution responsibilities over to a private firm."5 Under a long-term
arrangement, a private firm would, thus, manage, develop, maintain, and
distribute electricity to Northern Mariana residents.'
The privatization of public power generation in the Commonwealth, however, comes with anticipated problems. Possible concerns
indicated by the Blueprint for Good Growth are the "[flear of loss of
government jobs through privatization; possible increased utility rates;
[and] general resistance to change." 5 Proper planning is, therefore, needed
to avoid the possibility that privatization of power generation may result
in increased unemployment rates, elevated utility rates that may be

150. See id.; CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at 1-2 to 1-4.
151. See Belinsky, supra note 148, at 11.
152.
153.

See BLUEPRINTFORGOODGROWTH, supranote 137, at§4 (Infrastructure Resources).
Id. at 8 § 4.12.
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unreasonable for residents to pay, and heightened dissatisfaction of
residents stemming from the Government's decision to allow a private firn
to take over their utilities.
Other considerations that may impede privatization are as follows:
(1)the types, extent, and magnitude of the agreements between the United
States and the Commonwealth Government regarding the public utilities
and other development projects; (2) funding conditions and stipulations
imposed by the federal government that may have some effect on the
management and operation of the CUC; (3) the type, extent, and magnitude
of the existing fiscal indebtedness of the CUC and future indebtedness to
which the CUC has already obligated itself; (4) the inadequacy of existing
CUC laws and regulations; (5) other federal actions such as the imposition
of a federal minimum wage and control over immigration and labor and
environmental laws; (6) the issue of employment and availability of local
labor force; (7) shipment costs of fuel; (8) availability of public land; (9) the
geographic isolation of the Commonwealth in relation to resources; (10) the
distance between each main island area for utility services; (11) the overall
costs to upgrade and maintain equipment; and (12) the fact that it is more
expensive to provide utility services when the population is small and
spread out over several islands."s
Constraints to Privatization
Some immediate and foreseeable constraints to privatization
include the economic impact on existing CUC employees, employment of
more non-resident workers, and rate increases.1" Other possible obstacles
to privatization may include the ownership of land, payment of taxes, and
regulations enacted and contracts entered into to regulate the private
16

utility.

Real Property Ownership and Use Restrictionsin the Commonwealth
Real property ownership and leasing is subject to restrictions in the
Commonwealth based on the Commonwealth's Covenant and Constitution. If the potential "buyer" of a CUC utility is a non-indigenous person
and is not from the Northern Mariana Islands, the Commonwealth
Constitution's Articles XI and XII may pose ownership obstacles because
only persons of Northern Mariana descent may own land in the Common-
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160.

See CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at S-3 to S-5, tbl.S-2, 4-1 to 4-10.
See id. at 4-3 to 4-4.
See id. at 4-1 to 4-2, 4-5 to 4-10.
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wealth.16' All others must lease public land from the government or private
land from an indigenous Commonwealth landowner."
If the "buyer" of a Commonwealth utility is a corporation, then it
shall be considered to be a person of Northern Marianas
descent so long as it is incorporated in the Commonwealth,
has its principal place of business in the Commonwealth, has
directors one-hundred percent of whom are persons of
Northern Marianas descent and has voting shares (i.e.
common or preferred) one-hundred percent of which are
actually owned by persons of Northern Marianas descent as
defined by Section 4."1
Private firms owned by non-indigenous persons are also able to
overcome obstacles by using private properties. For example, the Constitutional guidelines provide that a non-indigenous person may lease public
land for not more than 25 years from the Commonwealth Government. 1"
The largest single plot of public land that such a person can lease without
legislative approval is five hectares.'" Furthermore, an individual may
lease private land from an indigenous person for up to 55 years.1"
Assuming the Commonwealth Government's role is to encourage
and assist the non-indigenous "buyer," some additional governmental
strategies might be available to help, such as (1) offering limited tax
incentives, (2) developing a healthy investment climate in which other
private entities that are not owned by "persons of Northern Marianas
descent" are investing in and successfully conducting business in the
Commonwealth, (3) initiating legislative action that extends public land
leases to 40 years, (4) instituting a lease-back contract by the government
at the expiration of the land lease agreement to assure that investors
recover their investments at the end of the lease term, and (5) encouraging
joint-venture arrangements between the private sector and the government
or the private sector and the general public through the CDA.
Commonwealth Taxes as an Obstacle to Privatization
All private entities that own or operate a business in the Northern
Mariana Islands are expected to pay gross revenue taxes."6 At the present

161.

162.
163.
164.
165.
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167.
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See id. at art. XI, § 5(c).
ld. at art. XII, § 5, as amended.
See id. at art. XII, § 5(c).
See id. at art. XI, § 5(d), as amended.
See id. at art. XII, § 3, as amended.
See Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Government, Taxation
Apr. 27, 2000) <http://www.mariana-islands.gov.mp/tax.htm>.
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time, because the CUC is a government entity, it is not paying this tax."
However, a private enterprise is expected to pay this tax and is compelled
to consider this cost because it increases costs of doing business in the
Commonwealth under a privatization arrangement.1 Should the CUC
decide to privatize one of its utilities, the Commonwealth Government, by
amending its statutes, may be able to alleviate concerns regarding taxation
as an obstacle to privatization by negotiating taxes owed over time or by
implementing a limited tax-free period for the gross revenue tax for the
utility company.
Employment Obstacles in the Commonwealth
Employment obstacles in the Commonwealth are found with both
local resident workers and alien workers." Political leaders are usually
concerned about possible rate increases and loss of jobs, which would have
a negative impact on their voting constituents. Since World War II, the
economy of the Northern Mariana Islands has been dominated by public
employment.17 The CUC employs over five hundred persons, including
mostly local but some non-resident workers."' This makes the CUC one of
the larger employers in the Commonwealth.173 These employees represent
more than five percent of the eligible voters, which makes their political
influence important.7 '
Though the minimum wage in the Commonwealth is presently
only $3.05, which is below the minimum wage in the United States, it is
higher than that of the foreign countries and the rest of Micronesia from
which non-resident workers emigrate to work in the populated areas of the
Commonwealth."7s As a result, the Commonwealth's labor market is filled
with people from Micronesia and Asia." 6 The hiring of non-resident
workers is, however, a very controversial issue. On the one hand, the
Commonwealth must rely to a large extent on foreign workers to develop
the tourism industry and to implement economic diversification activities
initiated by the Commonwealth Government,1 " due to the fact that the
available skills among the resident workforce are not well aligned with

168. See id.
169, See id.
170, See CH2MHLL, supra note 75, at 4-3 to 4-4.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at § I(K) (Minimum Wage).
176. See id.
177. See Tenorio Senate Testimony, supra note 33, at
Planning).
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existing overall job demand conditions in the Commonwealth. 78 On the
other hand, these non-resident workers have placed a tremendous strain
on the social, political, and economic structure of the Commonwealth and
its local citizens.'9
The average salary scale within the CUC is a little above private
sector wages paid in the Commonwealth.1' If privatization were to take
place today, chances are that a reduction in the CUC's workforce would
occur." Such a possibility threatens the job security of government
employees and can become a volatile political issue. A private firm at the
inception of privatization would most likely seek to cut operating costs.
One option would be to reduce wages and salaries of utility employees.
Such a reduction in wages and salaries would tend to encourage the
employment of nonresident workers to take over jobs or positions
presently held by local resident workers. Additionally, the private firm
would most likely retain only a few individuals who are skillful in their
trades while others would be released and replaced with the private firm's
staff or with less expensive foreign workers. Displacing some local voting
employees who have many voting family members is an example of a local
political issue that privatization might create.
A private company endeavoring to purchase a Commonwealth
utility must also be aware of local labor and immigration requirements.1"
A sample benefits package that private companies might be expected to
pay non-resident workers employed in the Commonwealth would include
(1) paying the Commonwealth's minimum wage; (2) providing free
benefits including housing, local transportation, transportation from their
point of recruitment and back, and medical and health care coverage; (3)
paying overtime and night differentials if applicable; and (4) providing
other fringe benefits. Private companies choosing to hire non-resident
workers must also work closely with the Commonwealth Employment
Division of the Department of Labor and Immigration.
The Commonwealth can minimize job displacement trauma by
providing training in technical and professional areas so that local workers
have a competitive edge in getting and keeping their employment. Another
alternative would be for the Commonwealth Government to provide a
quota on the number of foreign workers and monitor the ratio of the
number of resident workers to non-resident workers hired by the private

178. See id, at 4-3 to 4-4.
179. See id. at § I.
180. See CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at 4-3.
181. See id. at 4-3.
182. Seegenerally Labor &Immigration, 3 N. MAR. I. CODE (Supp. 1994); Tenorio Senate
Testimony, supra note 33, at § I.
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company, or the private company could be required to keep a certain
percentage of existing employees. Those employees whose jobs are not to
be immediately curtailed by utility services could be phased out within a
given period of time or incorporated into other government services. Also,
the Commonwealth Government might choose to offer incentives to those
local employees who venture to the private sector for employment or
engage in an entrepreneurial endeavor. If they decide to start their own
business,.the Commonwealth Governmentmight assist these local workers
to become entrepreneurs by offering small business development loans to
help with start-up capital. The Commonwealth Government can also help
displaced employees find other jobs in the private sector. For example, the
Government could utilize the Job Training Partnership Agency's services
for job counseling, assistance in securing new employment, and retraining.
Additionally, the Commonwealth Government could buy out a
local employee's remaining contract to include lump-sum cash payments,
education vouchers for re-training, and prepaid health insurance. These
strategies would ensure that the transition from public service to private
service would be consistent with the Commonwealth Code requirement
"[to contract to transfer to private ownership or control the construction,
management, and operation of the water, sewer and electrical power
systems in a public manner that is both timely and fair to the government,
its employees, and utility service customers."'m
Stumbling Blocks to Utility Rates
The CUC is permitted to establish utility rates for services rendered
to its customers.1s4 The existing statutes and regulations, however, do not
define rates or provide a method to calculate rates.1" It is important for the
Commonwealth Government and the CUC to determine their working
definition of a utility rate and establish a formula for calculating rates prior
to considering privatization. Otherwise, the private company is permitted
to present their definition of a utility rate and present their formula for
setting their rates for Commonwealth customers. The state of Pennsylvania
defines the term as
not simply the cost per unit of commodity; rather it
is..."[e]very.. .fare, toll, charge, rental, or other compensation
whatsoever of any public utility.. .made, demanded, or
received for any service"...differences in rates between
classes based on various recognized factors "are not only

183. Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR.
184. See id. at § 8123(m).
185. See id.
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permissible but often desirable and even necessary to achieve
reasonable efficiency and economy of operation."1
Assuming that the above definition is applicable to the CUC, the
probability of an increase in rates is high because the CUC is heavily
subsidized with loans and grants to meet its capital needs. Such a change
in rates would impose economic hardship on Commonwealth residents in
general and low-income residents in particular. In addition, the CUC is
currently unable to meet its debt payments. 187 This indebtedness, or
economic gloom, poses a great concern that rates would increase quickly
under private ownership in order to keep the CUC profitable.
Privatization of utilities does not preclude a natural political
concern for a rate increase resulting in an economic hardship on everyone
residing in the Commonwealth. The following are some suggestions for
reducing the obstacle of excessive rates: (1) Developing a comprehensive
and detailed privatization plan that would focus on improved service with
a reduction in rates. This plan may also include the Government's
reduction of its ownership of the utility infrastructure to a certain
percentage during the initial portion of privatization with an eventual
phasing out of government involvement over an agreed period of time; and
(2) Requiring the private firm to continue subsidizing higher cost residents
so that Commonwealth residents continue to pay the same rate. Saipan is
the most populated and most commercialized island area of the Commonwealth. As such, it produces the greatest utility revenues of any island
jurisdiction in the Commonwealth. Tinian, Rota, and the other islands cost
more to serve. In order to equalize rates so that all residential and business
users pay similar rates some of the revenues generated by customers in
Saipan go to make rates for Tinian, Rota, and the other islands more
economical and equal to the rates residents pay on Saipan.
Assuming the definition of rate and a formula for its calculation are
clarified, the Commonwealth Government can then begin developing a
desirable privatization model. Also, the Commonwealth Government may
have to impose a schedule for separate utility service rates for different
islands, residential users, commercial users, industrial users, or other
categories of consumption as stipulated in Commonwealth statutes.1" The
ultimate goal for operators of public utilities, as well as privatized
companies, is to accomplish full cost recovery while providing reliable,
efficient, and economical utility services to customers.1"

186.
(1992).
187.
188.
189.

Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Com'n, 612 A.2d 604, 611
See CH2MHILL, supra note 75, at 1-5.
See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N.MAR. I. CODE § 8141(d) (Supp. 1990).
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Privatization Contract Concerns

A well-written contract is important to ensuring the successful
privatization of any CUC utility. The development of a good working
knowledge about privatization is imperative for Commonwealth officials
to have and use in their planning and policy meetings and in developing
and implementing privatization contracts.
Also, the Commonwealth Government should retain the assistance
of someone who is experienced in negotiating and drafting a contract for
the privatization of utilities. If a utility is bid for privatization, the bidders
should be experienced and knowledgeable in negotiating. This is an
important factor that would help to "level the playing field" in negotiating
an agreement between the CUC and a successful bidder. Since it is the duty
of the Commonwealth Government to make privatization decisions in the
best interest of its constituents, the Government should ensure that the
private firm is willing to guarantee safe, reliable, and reasonably priced
utility services. The Commonwealth Government is also responsible to
assure that the private firm allows the promotion of non-economic services
that include and satisfy various social, health, and allocation issues."
Additionally, the Commonwealth Government is obligated to request
detailed specifications and performance standards in the privatization
contract. 191
The private firm is also concerned about its privatization contract
with a utility agency or CUC in this hypothetical situation. A private firm
is interested in obtaining some assurances from the Commonwealth
Government that CUC does not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner
by changing utility regulations or rules once a contract is signed.
Also, the private firm is interested in having some flexibility to
administer and operate the utility without political interference in meeting
its obligations. This is premised on the private firm complying with its
contract. The private firm should be made aware that there are specific, but
limited, contractual arrangements the Commonwealth Government is
willing to accept.
Presently, the CUC's Procurement Regulations identify these three
different types of contracts:
1. the prohibited cost-plus-a-percentage-cost and percentage of
construction cost methods of contracting;

190. See id. at 1-1.
191. See id.
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2. a contract that utilizes a firm fixed price unless use of a cost
reimbursement contract is justified under Paragraph 3 of CUC
Procurement Regulations; or
3. a cost reimbursement contract is used when the CUC Director
determines in writing, which is attached to the contract, that
a. uncertainties in the work to be performed make the cost of
performance too difficult to estimate with the degree of
accuracy required for a fixed price contract,
b. the use of a firm fixed price contract seriously affects the
contractor's financial stability or result in payment by CUC
for contingencies that never occur, or
c. the use of a cost reimbursement contract is likely to be less
nature of the
costly to CUC than any other type due to the
192
work to be performed under the contract.
Additionally, a private firm must also understand that it is
obligated to provide the essential services as contracted. The firm is also
entitled to receive a fair and reasonable rate of return for its services. Also,
all employees are to be treated fairly. Finally, the firm is expected to comply
with all Commonwealth laws.
In summary, there are several policy concerns that need to be
addressed before the Commonwealth Government is ready to implement
privatization. As a sole provider of public water, power, and sewer services
to consumers, the CUC plays a vital role in the social, political, and
economic health of the Commonwealth. Specific and more immediate
policy concerns are usually centered around the economic impact of
privatization on the welfare of existing employees and the possibility of
rate hikes for utility services provided.
SUGGESTED ELEMENTS FOR THE PROPOSED ENACTMENT OF
A REGULATORY COMMISSION FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES IN THE
COMMONWEALTH
In moving toward privatization, the CUC should retain ownership
of its assets if possible. The CUC should also clarify or define the level and
quality of service to be provided by a private firm to Commonwealth
consumers. Additionally, the CUC should establish a realistic and
reasonable price to be paid for services by consumers and pay the proposed
management firm directly for its services.

192. See Commonwealth Utility Commission, Proposed Procurement Regulations, 12
N. MAR. I. REG. 7069, 7087-88 pt. D, § 3-401 (1990) (Types of Contracts) (regulations became
final by Public Notice, 13 N. MAR. I. REG. 7853,7853 (1991)).

Summer 2000]

UTILITIES IN THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS

595

The Commonwealth does not have an existing regulatory
commission for public utilities. As a result, the following discussion
proposes suggested elements that the Commonwealth should consider in
developing a stronger public utility regulation commission. This model
centers on the following: (1) the jurisdiction of the Commission; (2)
qualifications of its commissioners; (3) a process for selecting commissioners; (4) a process for removing commissioners; (5) agency practices and
procedures; (6) staff recruitment and job protection guidelines; (7) fringe
benefits offered by the agency; (8) a disability insurance plan; (9) local and
off-island travel expenses; (10) paid holidays; (11) health, medical, and
hospitalization insurance plans; (12) a retirement plan; (13) a life insurance
plan; (14) sick leave; and (15) other benefits."
Proposed Jurisdiction of the Commission
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain in its policy handbook provisions about the
Commission's jurisdiction. The Commonwealth is served by several kinds
of utility services. These include (a) public and private electric plants; (b)
telephone agencies; (c) cable television companies; (d) common radio
carriers; (e) water, sewer services, and trash services; (f) water carriers; (g)
motor passenger carriers, including buses, taxis, and tour related transportation; and (h) vessels and aircraft operating from sea ports and airports in
the Commonwealth.
The model regulatory commission for public utilities in the
Commonwealth should contain clarification of which utilities are within its
jurisdiction to reduce confusion about its role in regulating utilities.
Proposed Qualifications of Commissioners
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain qualifications of commissioners in its policy
handbook. These qualifications should include provisions that state the
following: a commissioner (a) may not own any bonds or stocks in any
public utility, be employed by, or have any pecuniary interest in any utility;
(b) must be domiciled in the Northern Mariana Islands; (c) must be a
qualified voter of the Commonwealth; (d) must not have been found guilty
of any serious crime; and (e) must be a graduate of an accredited school of
law, engineering, finance, accounting, economics, business, or public
administration. In addition, it may be advisable to stipulate that the

193. See generally PAUL RODGERS, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER
REGULATIONOFTHENATIONAL ASSOCIATIONOF REGULATORY UTILrrYCOMMISSIONERS (1989).
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commission has at least two members who are consumers of the utility's
services. Other helpful stipulations are that commissioners must devote full
time to their duties as members and may not hold any other public offices
or employment during their terms of office. This should be helpful in
ensuring that members of the commission are focused on their jobs.
Proposed Selection of Commissioners
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain guidelines for the proposed selection of
commissioners in its policy handbook. Some suggestions are that (a) no
more than three of the members may be affiliated with the same political
party and any appointment to fill a vacancy shall be for the unexpired
term; (b) five members shall be appointed by the governor to four year
terms with the advice and consent of both houses, or elected at large; and
(c) the commission chairman shall be appointed by the governor.
The proposed process to remove a commissioner is by the
governor, by and with the consent of the majority of the legislature after
due notice and a formal hearing for (a) inefficiency, (b) neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office, (c) corruption, (d) incompetence, or (e) conflict of
interest. Reasons for removal may be based on active participation in
political management or campaigns by any commissioner and shall
constitute cause for removal. There must be sufficient proof of such
involvement by the accuser.
Proposed Agency Practices and Procedures
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain proposed agency practices and procedures in
its policy handbook. Issues to be considered are determining who has
standing to request relief from the agency, and who has standing to
intervene in an agency proceeding. Other issues include providing that (a)
any person may make a request for relief from the commission and any
person who may be affected by the outcome of the case may intervene in
its proceedings; (b) any interested person or public utility may make a
formal complaint to the commission on any matters subject to the
jurisdiction of the commission; and (c) any person not a party of a
proceeding may make written application for leave to intervene showing
the extent of their interest in the matter. Upon its granting, the person shall
thereafter be an intervenor in the proceeding.
An appearance before the commission should not constitute the
practice of law, however, parties and intervenors may be represented by
attorneys. The admissibility of evidence in commission proceedings does
not constitute the practice of law and parties do not need to be represented
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by attorneys. The admissibility of evidence in the proceeding is to be
determined by the relevancy and competency of the evidence. Also, the
commission should be required to follow limitations, if any, that are placed
on the cross-examination of witnesses and on oral arguments before the
agency. If necessary, the presiding officer is to use his discretion in limiting
the cross-examination of witnesses or oral arguments in any proceeding.
The time and place for regular and executive meetings of the
commission can be determined by the commission. All meetings, except
executive sessions of the commissioners, should be open to the public with
advance notice of the meeting being provided to the public. Executive
sessions should not be open to the public and should only be used to
consider litigation, enforcement proceedings, and personnel matters. In
cases where emergencies arise, the process for this situation needs to be
stated in writing. Also, public notice and the opening of executive sessions
to the public need to be clarified.
In addition, the commissioners and staff personnel should be
governed by a written code of conduct. Such code should prohibit
commissioners and personnel from engaging in conflicts of interest and
should provide guidance as to the ethical performance of their duties.
Proposed Staff Recruitment and Job Protection
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain proposed staff recruitment and job protection
statements in its policy handbook. It is desirable that most Commission
employees be covered by the merit system of the Commonwealth
Government, except for positions such as attorney, public information
officer, comptroller, and other key management positions that should be
under competitive appointment procedures adopted by the Office of
Personnel Management. In addition, advisors to Commissioners and the
Executive Director and their immediate personal staff also qualify under
competitive appointment procedures.
Proposed Agency Fringe Benefits
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain agency fringe benefits in its policy handbook.
For example, annual leave should be based on Commonwealth Civil
Service standards for all Civil Service employees and should include 21
working days of annual leave per year for commissioners and staff
members under competitive appointment procedures.
Disability insurance should be made available to all probationary,
perminent, or temporary employees who work for a certain minimum
number of hours per week. Provisions should be made for long-term
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disability insurance to be paid for by the Commonwealth with additional
insurance available at group rates to be paid by employees.
In addition, worker's compensation should be provided by the
Commonwealth Government. If an employee becomes incapable of
performing regular duties due to physical, visual, or mental disability
occasioned at work, he or she should be allowed to retire at any age subject
to approval of the Disability Office and based on a qualified physician's
prognosis. Employees with a qualifying disability should be entitled to
income benefits depending on the temporary, long-term, or permanent
nature of the disability. In addition, disabled persons should not be barred
from securing part-time employment, not to exceed $1,000 per month.
Local and Off-Island Travel
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain local and off-island travel guidelines in its
policy handbook. For example, per diem rates should be set at different
base rates for different areas within and outside of the Commonwealth.
Government automobiles may be permanently assigned to Commissioners
and, as needed, to selected staff members. All actual and reasonable travel
and subsistence expenses necessarily incurred in the performance of the
Commissioner's job should be reimbursed. If a pool vehicle is not available,
employees should be allowed to use personal automobiles and receive
reimbursement at a rate based on the standard Commonwealth rate.
Finally, no entertainment expense should be allowed without approval
from the Governor.
Proposed Paid Holidays
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain a list of proposed paid holidays in its policy
handbook. The list of paid holidays should be based on Commonwealth
law.
Proposed Health, Medical, and Hospitalization Insurance
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain health, medical, and hospitalization insurance
provisions in its policy handbook. The Commonwealth should contribute
a portion of the costs.
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A Proposed Retirement Plan
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain a proposed retirement plan in its policy
handbook. The best approach is to have contributions paid by both the
Commission and the employee based on existing Commonwealth
government guidelines at the time an employee is hired. Non-resident
workers should not qualify for and should not contribute to the fund based
on Commonwealth provisions.
A Proposed Life Insurance Plan
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain a proposed life insurance plan in its policy
handbook. The plan should be based on the Commonwealth Govenment's
insurance plan. Also, an additional payment of six months salary should
be paid to the employee's estate if an employee dies while employed by the
Commission.
Proposed Sick Leave Plan
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain a proposed sick leave plan in its policy
handbook. This plan should be differentiated according to these guidelines:
(a) senior management, such as commissioners, executive director, public
information officer, comptroller, and attorneys should not have sick leave
but should have a higher level of annual leave; (b) sick leave for noncompetitive positions should be based on the existing Commonwealth-Civil
Service policy; and (c) employees eligible for sick leave should be permitted
to use accrued sick leave for family illness or injuries.
Other Proposed Benefits
A model regulatory commission for public utilities in the Commonwealth should contain other proposed benefits in its policy handbook.
Employees should be given a choice of contributing to Social Security, the
Commonwealth Retirement Fund, or to both programs. Consideration of
other benefits is recommended. Examples are (a) a deferred compensation

plan; (b) educational assistance or tuition reimbursement for job-related
college credit; (c) funeral or bereavement leave; (d) jury duty; (e) sabbatical
leave; (f) an achievement bonus for professional certification; (g) maternity
and paternity leave according to Commonwealth provisions; and (h)
registration, tuition, travel, and per diem paid for approved seminars,
courses, and conventions for Commissioners and key staff members.
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Educational leave should be recommended with pay for up to one year and
without pay for more than one year unless approved by the Governor.
CONCLUSION
The public's economic perspective in the Commonwealth,
especially on Saipan, focuses on the fear of loss of government jobs
resulting from privatization and the possibility of increased utility rates to
satisfy full cost recovery. These concerns are important to understand since
power operations in Tinian and Rota are currently subsidized from
revenues generated by power operations on Saipan.
The Commonwealth operates the CUC under Public Law 4-47,
which provides the CUC with a mechanism to regulate, manage, and
operate public utility services in the Northern Mariana Islands" However,
Public Law 4-47 needs to be amended to reflect existing problems and
needs, as discussed herein, so that the CUC will be able to provide more
efficient, reliable, affordable, safe, and environmentally friendly public
utility services. Legally, some federal or Commonwealth laws seem to pose
outright hindrances and may need to be changed before privatization
alternatives are implemented. In other cases, a law may not require
amending but may present slight obstacles to privatization alternatives by
imposing undue duties or obligations on the new private entity or by
increasing its cost of doing business. As a start, the CUC's Board needs to
sponsor a comprehensive revision of the CUC's operating regulations for
its utilities and should solicit input from the Commonwealth Legislature
to ensure successful passage of recommended changes.
Also, the CUC Board needs to establish themselves as a functional
regulatory board that oversees all Commonwealth utilities and establishes
fair and reasonable rates and fees in accordance with statute.'9 5As a shortterm alternative, the Commonwealth Government needs to amend its
existing enabling legislation to provide regulatory powers to the CUC like
those provided by regulatory commissions in the United States. Finally,
Public Law 4-47 stipulates that the CUC's Board is responsible for
96
approving utility rates that provide a reasonable return on investment."
There is no doubt that general authority is given to the Board to set rates
by Public Law 4-47, but the main question is whether this grant of
authority is adequate authority since it is not clearly defined.

194.

See Commonwealth Utilities Corporation, 4 N. MAR. I. CODE §§ 8111-74 (Supp.

1994).
195. See id. at §§ 8123(k), (m).

196. See id. at § 8122(b).
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Unless the CUC is in full cost recovery, privatization of the CUC
utilities may not be in the best interest of Commonwealth residents. A
private firm may not be able to provide fair, equitable, and cost-effective
utility services if it is taking over an insolvent utility company, since it may
not be able to get a fair and equitable return on its investment. However,
should the Commonwealth Government decide to privatize, the Government should conduct fact-finding visits to similar utility communities that
have privatized their utility services in order to obtain on-site information
about the privatization process and its pitfalls. The Commonwealth
Legislature should be involved in the privatization discussion because this
would ensure a smoother transition from the CUC operating public utilities
to private ownership and operation of the utilities.
Once the Commonwealth Government decides upon the model or
models of privatization it desires for utility services, the responsibilities of
the CUC should be expanded and more clearly defined so that the CUC can
regulate private owners of the utilities serving the Commonwealth. If the
Commonwealth Government decides to contract only a partial activity of
a utility, it must define the scope and legal aspects of the contract.
The Commonwealth Government might also consider retaining a
team of experts to assist in the establishment of procurement objectives,
strategies, procedures, and detailed action plans for priyatization. These
experts could be assigned to prepare the entire set of documents from start
to finish. Also, this team could set criteria needed to evaluate prospective
purchasers and recommend other documents needed by the Commonwealth Government.
The idea and concept of privatization is attractive for many
reasons. On the other hand, taking such a drastic step could have some
negative consequences for the Commonwealth. Overall, privatization is an
appealing option to help the Commonwealth reduce its costs and turn the
operation of its utilities over to a firm that has the technical know how, as
well as the management and leadership skills, to run the operation as
effectively, efficiently, and consistently as possible.

